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WILLIAM F. SWINDLER
THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND LAW
REFORM, 1921-1971
I. Tm STATE OF THE JUDICIARY
In his first two and a half years in office, Warren E. Burger
has introduced a new type of activism into the role of the Chief
Justice: leader of law reform. A sense of urgency-to arouse the
public and the legal profession to the advanced state of obsolescence
of many parts of the judicial machinery-has colored a number of
his pronouncements. A sense of the need for a refurbished image
of the Supreme Court itself-down to details like livening the marble
halls and inner courts of the building, or planning a series of exhibits
on the personalities who have sat on the bench over the years-is
related to this goal of revision and revitalization. A desire to
encourage a dialogue with the man in the street on the issues of
judicial business is also demonstrable. In his 1971 "State of the
Judiciary" address to the American Bar Association, the Chief
Justice declared that "the public is deeply aroused and disturbed
about the state of justice and all its works" and urged the legal
profession to "share the leadership for court improvement with all
segments of the public."'
Warren Earl Burger, when he ascended the high bench in June
1969, found federal policy already headed in the direction in which
he proposed to move, in matters of modernization, revision, and
William F. Swindler is Professor of Law, College of- William and Mary.
1 Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 57 A.BAJ. 855, 858 (1971) (here-
inafter cited as 1971 State of Judiciary).
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reform.2 Congress-and the Johnson administration-had prepared
the way with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19 68 .
3 Its declared purpose is "to assist State and local governments
in reducing the incidence of crime" and "to increase the effective-
ness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal
justice systems at all levels of government.' 4 Title I of this statute
created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA),
whose primary responsibility is to administer a concerted program
of state-planned improvements in the systems of justice throughout
the country. The billions of dollars in federal funds allocated
annually by the LEAA to planning commissions in each of the
states was an unprecedented role for the national legislative and
executive branches with regard to what they unequivocally declared
to be a local problem. As LEAA policy broadened, from an initial
emphasis upon strengthened police programs to the whole spectrum
of judicial administration, corrections, and rehabilitation, circum-
stances invited the third branch of the federal government to join
in the activity.5
Chief Justice Burger's own plan of action for the current crises
in the courts has substantially complemented the LEAA program.
And what is most significant is that in the process the Chief Justice
of the United States has emerged as leader of the reform and
modernization movement in state as well as federal courts.6 Thus,
2 "The term, 'law reform,' has no exact, objective meaning." Friedman, Law
Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST.L.UJL.J. 351 (1969). While there is no
consensus of legal lexicography, in the context of the present study "moderniza-
tion" is used to describe any simplification and streamlining of process; "revision"
suggests a somewhat more elaborate (e.g, legislative) form of the same thing;
"reform," properly used, would suggest the introduction of new concepts into
existing law. Cf. Swindler, Revision and Reform in the Common Law Countries,
13 WM. & MARY L. REv. (in press) (1971).
3 82 Stat. 197; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.
4 Ibid.
5 See the analysis of the LEAA program and objectives, in Velde, External Rela-
tionships of the Courts: LEAA and the Administration of Justice, 54 J. AA. Jun.
Soc. 433 (1971); SWINDLER, JUSTICE IN THE STATES 52 (1971) (hereafter cited as
JUSTICE IN THE STATES).
6 "I have felt an obligation to be concerned with the problems of state courts
as well as the federal courts because the problems of justice are indivisible and
if we do not have strong and effective courts in both the state and federal systems,
we have a failure of justice." 1971 State of Judiciary, at 856.
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half a century after William Howard Taft initiated the first steps
toward making his office into the head of the whole federal court
structure, there has emerged the concept of the Chief Justice's
leadership role in modernizing all components, state as well as
federal, in a total administration of justice in the 1970s.
It is obvious that in an integrated economy, efforts to come to
grips with problems of reform in the state or federal court systems
will have reciprocal effects. It is equally obvious that improvements
in the judicial process in many states, so long overdue, need to be
coordinated if the country as a whole is to benefit to the fullest
extent, and that this presupposes some sort of national direction.
While coordinated national effort is to be distinguished from state
reforms carried out under federal authority, the fact is that the
office of the Chief Justice may be the only agency able to develop
and maintain the needed momentum. This development may,
indeed, be complementary to four other forces developed in the
course of history to effect unification, simplification, and thus,
presumably, modernization of both substantive law and procedure.
The most obvious force for revision and uniformity (if not nec-
essarily reform) of legal doctrine is Supreme Court decisions.
particularly in constitutional cases.7 Almost equally effective in
the procedural area have been the federal rules of procedure. Cer-
tainly one of the most conspicuous results of the promulgation
of the rules of civil and criminal procedure in the 1930s was their
prompt and pervasive effect upon state procedure.8 The often
herculean labors of farsighted state jurists-e.g., Arthur T. Vander-
bilt and Roger J. Traynor-have had significant impact upon both
procedural and substantive law, but in the nature of the case their
full influence has tended to be limited to their states of professional
domicile. Finally, there have been the efforts of many professional
organizations, led by the American Judicature Society, veteran
of six decades of uphill battles for reform, including some of the
studies of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
7See H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong, 1st Sess., 10 (1963); Criminal.Justice Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. State action in this instance had anticipated
both Court and Congress. See the amicus brief of twenty-three states, filed in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 See Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1958: Two Decades of
the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958); Holtzoff, Judicial Pro-
cedure Reform: The Leadership of the Supreme Court, 43 A.B.AJ. 215 (1957).
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State Laws;9 certain projects of the American Law Institute; 0 and
such current undertakings as the American Bar Association's Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice."
The logic of the Chief Justice's leadership in this broadening
panorama of judicial modernization and law reform is twofold. In
the first place, if for no other reason than to alleviate the pressures
on the federal courts, the federal interest would be best served
by rendering the state systems more effective in order to equalize
the judicial workload.'2 In the second place, however valid may
be the philosophical appeal to a restored state-federal equilibrium
in governmental affairs, the fact is that in the United States of the
1970s such an equilibrium can only be meaningful and effective if
it is the product of coordinated effort. This may point to the
approaching zenith of many of the programs of professional orga-
nizations referred to above, perhaps implemented through the new
National Center for State Courts. But its ultimate psychological
and practical impetus will still have to be provided by some
universally acknowledged judicial leader. No state jurist, however
inspirational, is likely to perform that function. Even the tireless
efforts over the years of an individual like Justice Tom C. Clark
can only have such continuity as is provided by his own person-
ality.13 A long-range plan under an institutionalized leadership is
required-formulating the complementary functions of the state
9 E.g., the uniform laws on securing out-of-state witnesses in criminal cases;
judicial notice of foreign law; photographic records in evidence; proof of statutes;
and simultaneous death. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COIAsIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS Table I 360 (1970).
1oE.g., A.L.I., STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (1968).
11 See 1965 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssociATioN 229 (hereafter
cited as A.B.A. REP.), and annual reports thereafter of the Special Committee on
Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice in succeeding
volumes.
2 This was the fundamental consideration in the study commissioned by the
Federal Judicial Center and published as State Post-Conviction Remedies and
Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147 (1970). See also Meador,
The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REv.
286 (1966); Jacob & Sharma, Justice after Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services
in the Crizinal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1970).
13 John P. Frank has written an insightful tribute, in Justice Tom Clark and
judicial Administration, 46 THx L. REv. 5 (1967).
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and federal courts,14 defining the points of priority and major
emphasis in the agenda for reform and modernization, exhorting
individuals and organizations to maintain the momentum of change.
The present Chief Justice has covered a broad spectrum of
subjects during his first thirty months of administration. In 1969
he urged action to provide basic managerial training for selected
personnel to handle the business of state and local courts, in a
fashion analogous to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, and the Institute for Court Management was forthwith
established. In his first 'State of the Judiciary" address to the
American Bar Association in 1970, he enumerated a series of
specific steps which he urged be taken at the earliest opportunity.
In his keynote address to the National Conference on the Judiciary,
held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in March 1971, he renewed a call
for creation of a National Center for State Courts, a service and
research agency complementing the work of the Federal Judicial
Center.' 5
It is worth noting that this campaign for modernization has
produced concrete results. The Institute for Court Management
has now turned out three classes of trainees and placed them in
nearly a hundred courts throughout the country. The suggestion
for establishment of state-federal judicial councils, one of the
items in the 1970 A.B.A. address, has been taken up by more
than forty states. The National Center for State Courts was
formally incorporated in June 1971 and is operational in several
programs. All of these are traceable to the Chief Justice's affirma-
tive proposals and they are all, essentially, aimed at improving the
performance of state judicial offices. It is, indeed, the total judiciary
in the United States with whose condition the Chief Justice is
concerned.
The condition of the American judicial system is parlous, if the
volume of commentary, alarmist but expressed by competent
14 And also the complementary functions of legislatures and courts. See Burger,
CJ., in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971), commenting on the business
which "is more properly left to the determination by the States and the people
than to the courts operating under the broad mandate of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Cf. also the general tenor of his opinion in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
";Burger, Court Administrators-Where Will We Find Them? 53 J. AM. JuD.
Soc. 108 (1969); The State of the judiciary, 56 A.BA.J. 929 (1970) (hereafter
cited as 1970 State of Judiciary); JusncE IN THE STATEs 10.
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observers, is taken at face value. John P. Frank's lectures at the
dedication of the Earl Warren Legal Center at the University of
California in 1968 were an elaborate calendar of the cumbersome
anachronisms that impede virtually every function of judicial
administration.' In 1969 two University of Chicago writers pre-
pared a comparable indictment of the archaisms in the criminal
law.'1 In 1970 before the American Bar Association, and in 1971
before the National Conference on the Judiciary, Chief Justice
Burger reiterated the problems.'1 The major items may be
epitomized:
Administratively, the judicial system is clogged with steadily
increasing masses of papers and records that require the fullest
utilization of modern management and technologicial processes.
Most state courts, and many federal courts, have not begun to
exploit such aids as the professional court administrator, data banks
for rapid retrieval of relevant information, and closed-circuit tele-
vision for routing of personnel and assignment of cases in a
metropolitan trial court complex.
Procedurally, in both civil and criminal law, the courts still
operate within the confines of a century-old formula that encour-
ages trial delay, discourages thorough pretrial disposition of all
but the most fundamental points of litigation, and mounts costs
one upon another. Few courts have made the fullest use of non-
judicial personnel to settle issues that could most satisfactorily be
disposed of by specialists, e.g., in litigation involving money settle-
ments where claims adjusters or accountants representing the
court as well as the parties could recommend the basis for the
judgment.
Substantively, a long list of litigable rights has been added to
the law on top of an already existing list reflecting values of an
earlier social climate. In certain areas, with automobile accident
claims being the most conspicuous example, administrative rather
than judicial disposition of civil causes is an alternative waiting
to be tried. In other areas, defined as criminal by statute but recog-
16 FRANK, AMERtCAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969).
17 MORRIS & HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
(1970).
18 See note 15 supra.
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nized as subjects for therapeutic institutionalization by modern
science, the remedies await enlightened legislative action.
Against this broad background of needs, the Chief Justice in
successive speeches and papers has enumerated specific remedies.
State criminal cases in the federal courts, he told the National
Association of Attorneys General in February 1970, may have
arrived there by virtue of the holdings in the so-called "trilogy"
of cases on post-conviction remedies,"' but they will return to their
proper forum only when and as the states cure the defects in their
own procedures that precipitated the constitutional questions
involved.20 The cycle of arrest-trial-conviction-sentence, produc-
ing steadily diminishing returns in crime control, requires that
judges look beyond the courtroom in aid of the search for new
concepts and more effective procedures for the correctional phase
of criminal justice.2' Repeatedly, Chief Justice Burger has urged
states to modernize their management systems and take fuller
advantage of new technologies to break logjams of paperwork.22
All courts, both state and federal, in his view should take a fresh
look at possible alternatives to adjudication of civil actions involving
automobile litigation. 23 The classic problem of costly and time-
consuming appellate review remains unsolved for virtually all
judicial systems. 24
II. CHIEF JUsrIcEs AND LAW REFORM
His unique public career as both President and Chief Justice of
the United States, coupled with his lifelong interest in substantive
and procedural law reform, gave William Howard Taft a pioneer-
ing leadership role in judicial history that has only belatedly been
recognized.2 5 Even as a member of Theodore Roosevelt's cabinet,
19 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293; Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
20 Burger, State Crininal Cases in Federal Courts: Some Proposas for Self-Help
and Mutual Aid, MS of remarks to National Association of Attorneys General,
Washington, D.C, 6 February 1970.
21 See Burger, "No Man Is an Island," 56 A.B.AJ. 325 (1970).
22 Note 15 supra.
23 1970 State of Judiciary, 930. 24 Ibid.
2 5 See MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JusticE chs. 4, 5 (1964); SWINDLER,
THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932, ch. 16 (1969).
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Taft witnessed the statutory beginning of modernization, the enact-
ment of the United States Criminal Code, which went into effect
the day before his inauguration.26 As President, Taft sponsored the
Judicial Code of 1911, reorganizing the federal courts and trimming
off masses of deadwood, reflecting many of the recommendations
in Taft's public statements over the years.2 7 A decade later, when
he ascended the bench, Taft brought with him specific agenda for
completing the work begun in 1909 and 1911. These were to be
incorporated into a draft bill prepared in the Court itself, and
indirectly floor-managed through Congress by a committee con-
sisting of Justices Day, McReynolds, and Van Devanter. 2
The "Judges' Bill" originally embodied all three of Taft's
basic reforms-authority in the Chief Justice to reassign lower
court judges as docket requirements warranted; greatly enlarged
discretionary (certiorari) jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and
corresponding enlarged final jurisdiction in the intermediate courts;
and power to create uniform rules of procedure throughout the
federal system.29 Enactment was piecemeal, over a period of years
extending beyond Taft's lifetime. In September 1922 came the
statute creating the Conference of Senior Circuit Court Judges, later
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and providing for the
transfer of federal judges.80 The main portion of the "Judges' Bill"
was enacted in February 1925, substantially redistributing the
review processes between the circuit courts of appeal and the
Supreme Court.31 It remained for Chief Justice Hughes's Court
to witness the completion of the reforms, in legislation authorizing
26 35 Stat. 1088; 18 U.S.C. chs. 1-119, 201-37, 301-17, 401-03, as amended.
27 36 Stat. 1087; 28 U.S.C. chs. 1-21, as amended. See also Taft, The Delays of
the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28 (1908); Inequalities in the Administration of justice, 20
GREEN BAG 441 (1908); The Administration of Justice-Its Speeding and Cheapen-
ing, 72 CE r. LJ. 191 (1911).
28 SWINDLER, note 25 supra, at ch. 16.
29 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BusiNEgs OF TnE SUPREME COURT 295-98
(1927); Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business, 7 A.BAJ. 453 (1921);
Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.BA.J. 34 (1922).
3o 42 Stat. 837, 838; 62 Star. 902, and later amended; 28 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq.,
§§ 331 et seq., as amended.
3143 Stat. 936; 62 Stat. 927, and later amended; cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252 et seq.,
§§ 1292 et seq., as amended.
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the drafting of uniform rules32 and the act creating the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts in June 1939.33
The legislation extending from 1922 to 1939 completed the
basic structure of the federal judiciary for the twentieth century.
Only the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,14
with its machinery in Title I for a federal investment in state
judicial reorganization, is of comparable magnitude, supplemented
perhaps by the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.' 5
In any event, it was from the earlier period of legislation that the
Chief Justices from Taft to Warren developed their roles as
leaders of reform and modernization within the federal system,
and it is in the context of the recent legislation, particularly the
1968 statute, that Chief Justice Burger is now shaping his own role.
In his presiding role at the periodic meetings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Chief Justice exercises the
administrative leadership that Taft envisioned in his original pro-
gram. In invited appearances before the major professional forums,
like the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association,
and in other public appearances and in published writings, the
Chief Justice exercises an unofficial but occasionally more significant
influence. 36 Two extraordinary instances of Chief Justices mounting
the hustings inevitably come to mind: Charles Evans Hughes's
famous letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee in the course of
the "Court packing" bill of 1937,37 and Earl Warren's warning of
the surreptitious movement to rewrite the Constitution in the
states' rights amendments proposed in 1963.38
3247 Stat. 904, 18 U.S.C. § 3772; 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. § 2072; 54 Stat. 688, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3288, 3289, 3141.
3353 Stat. 1223, 28 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
3482 Stat. 197, 28 US.C. §§ 3701 et seq.
35 78 Stat. 552, 18 U..C. §§ 3001 et seq.
36 Taft was the most voluble publicist for law reform until the present Chief
Justice; cf. the citations in notes 27 and 29 supra. Stone's most prolific period was
in his academic years. See MASON, HARLAN Fjsit SToNE: PILAR OF THE LAw 888
(1956). Taft and Hughes appeared occasionally before the American Law Institute,
but by the later 1950s Warren had established the practice of annual addresses to
this group. Usually these addresses abstracted the reports of the Judicial Con-
ference, but on at least one occasion they urged A.L.I. action. See note 64 infra.
37 The most recent detailed treatment of this event is BAKER, BACK To BACK:
THE DUEL BEIVEEN F.D.R. AND THE SUPREmE COURT (1967).
3 8 See 40rH ANNUAL PRocEErINGs OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSnTUTE 36-37 (1963)
(hereafter cited as A.L.I. Paoc.).
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Taft and Hughes of necessity focused their main efforts on the
basic reorganization of the federal judicial process as implemented
in the "organic" statutes of 1922, 1925, 1933, 1934, and 1939.31
Taft, as the godfather of the legislative program, had high hopes
for the Judicial Conference and for the circuit conferences or
councils that he expected to implement the findings of the senior
circuit judges.40 At the first'meeting of the Judicial Conference in
December 1922,'41 he dwelt upon the remaining provisions in the
"Judges' Bill" still to be pushed through Congress, particularly the
project to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.42 Without the
full scope of the reorganization, however, the Judicial Conference
sessions during Taft's tenure tended to be relatively brief exchanges
of information. The judges considered that the 1922 statute was
too general and in 1930 they requested the Attorney General to
seek clarifying amendments to the act.43
Hughes sought to educate the legal profession generally to the
39 See notes 30-32 supra.
4o Strengthened circuit councils were urged by the Judicial Conference as early
as 1932. Cf. 1932 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL 12 (hereafter cited
as ArrY GEN. REP.). Chief Justice Stone envisioned the councils of the circuits as
being of great practical importance because of their being closer to the public and
the public's business in the courts. Stone, Functions of the Circuit Conferences,
28 A.B.A.J. 519 (1942); and see 1941 REPORT OF THE JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE 4 (here-
after cited as JUa. CoNF. REP.). But in 1964 Chief Justice Warren was to complain:
"The judicial councils of the country, which are close to the bench and bar, have
a great opportunity to regulate and improve the processing of legal business to the
great benefit of all concerned.... I have the conviction that if these judicial coun-
cils did exercise their power to improve judicial administration as fully as they are
authorized to do, the need for Congressional action would be minimized." A.L..
PRoc. 26 (1964). See also Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal
Judicial Administration, 37 UNIV. OF Cm. L. REv. 203 (1970); and note 57 infra.
41 The first two meetings of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (now the
Judicial Conference) were never officially reported. With Chief Justice Taft's
acquiescence, an abstract of the proceedings appeared in The Federal Judicial
Council, 2 TE-x. L. REv. 458 (1924).
42 Id. at 459.
43 Until 1940, the meetings of the Judicial Conference were abstracted in the
annual reports of the Attorney General. For examples of the conference's reluc-
tance to assert authority in matters of administration, see 1925 ATr'Y GEN. REP. 6
(the proper use of judicial discretion in denying bail to convicts pending review
of their cases on appeal), and 1927 ATr'Y GEN. REP. 7 (urging the district courts
to consider dismissal of year-old motions). For the conference recommendation
that the Attorney General seek an amendment strengthening the 1922 statute, see
1930 ATr'y GEN. REP. 8.
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work of the conference, and in 1934 began submitting to the
American Bar Association Journal the summary of the conference
proceedings as it appeared in the annual reports of the Attorney
General.44 Stone continued this practice until the Second World
War curtailed the annual meetings,45 and Vinson later revived the
practice briefly.46 Later, as Chief Justice Warren made his annual
appearances before the American Law Institute, a summary of
conference business was usually incorporated into his report to
that audience.
The typical agenda for the Judicial Conference sessions, in the
early part of Hughes's administration, consisted of statistical reports
on the condition of the calendars in the several circuits, and a
summary of prospective legislation as submitted by the Attorney
General, with the judges usually endorsing the bills recommended
by that cabinet officer. 47 The Attorney General also submitted
procedural problems in the district courts as these were reported
to him by United States attorneys. In 1936, Attorney General
Cummings urged that something be done about the "prevailing
tendency" in a number of the federal trial courts to delay imposing
sentences in criminal cases, "even when there is 'no impediment'
operating against such imposition." 48 The conference thereupon
adopted a resolution condemning the practice, citing the Criminal
Appeals Rules to the contrary. The following year the Attorney
General reported on the problem of hearing motions, many of his
staff trial lawyers complaining that some courts heard motions
only one day a month, and some only on the opening day of the
Term. The sense of the conference was that the senior circuit
judges should investigate the practice in their respective circuits. 49
Disparity in sentencing practices in different federal courts was the
44See Hughes, Report of the Judicial Conference, 20 A.B.AJ. 713 (1934); 21
A.B.A.J. 731 (1935); 22 A.B.AJ. 818 (1936).
4r See Stone, The Judicial Conference, 28 A.BAJ. 817 (1942); Sunderland,
Report of the Judicial Conference, 30 A.B.AJ. 707 (1944).
46 Vinson, Chief Justice Reports September Proceedings, 34 A.BAJ. 132 (1948);
35 A.B.AJ. 118 (1949).
47 1932 ArT'y GEN. REP. 11-12; 1933 Arr'y GEN. REP. 5.
48 1936 Arr'y GEN. REP. 7.
40 1937 Arr'y GEN. REP. 14. In this same year the conference adopted a resolu-
tion urging appointment of a public defender or private counsel for indigent de-
fendants in felony cases. Id. at 17.
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subject of a Department of Justice study submitted to the confer-
ence by the Attorney General in 1938,50 but there is no record of
conference action.
The reliance of the Judicial Conference upon an officer of the
executive department to discharge a major portion of its business
was a fundamental limitation upon the conference's own effective-
ness, and this was remedied in 1939 with the creation of the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts. This statute, the product
of a good deal of preliminary study, transferred to the Director of
the Administrative Office various functions formerly handled by
the Department of Justice.5" In 1948 the original 1922 statute was
further strengthened by an amendment providing that conference
proceedings and recommendations for legislation be directly
reported to Congress by the Chief Justice.52 The 1948 revision also
formally recognized the judicial conferences of the various circuits
and detailed their specific functions. 53 In 1958 an amendment pro-
vided for a continuing study of the federal rules, and for the
development of institutes or joint councils on sentencing practices. 14
Recent statutory developments of importance have included the
1967 act creating the Federal Judicial Center,55 and the 1971 statute
providing for court administrators in all circuits.5"
Harlan F. Stone, newly invested as Chief Justice, called a special
session of the Judicial Conference in September 1941 and sub-
mitted lengthy agenda reflecting his eagerness to stimulate the
agency to a wider range of activities. Among the topics on his
list were the perennial matter of making the circuit councils more
productive, consideration among other legislative matters of a
proposal to abolish the statutory division of judicial districts, and
50 1938 Ar'Y GEN. REP. 24.
51 53 Stat. 1223, 28 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. Since 1940, the annual reports of the
Judicial Conference and the Director of the Administrative Office have been pub-
lished together. See the (first) 1940 ANIIuAL REPORT OF THE DRECTOR, 17-22, de-
scribing the organization of his office.
52 62 Stat. 902, 28 U.S.C. § 331; see H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947).
53 62 Stat. 902, 28 U.S.C. § 332.
5472 Stat. 356, 845, 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 334.
55 81 Stat. 664, 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29.
5684 Stat. 1907, 28 U.S.C. § 332(e), (f). Cf. also 1970 JuD. CoNr. REP. 77.
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improvement in the methods of selecting juries in federal trials.57
Unfortunately, Stone's efforts to galvanize the conference were
cut short by the Second World War, and the annual sessions were
curtailed until 1945. Momentum was not regained, in the sense
of seeking to break new ground, until midway in Vinson's Chief
Justiceship, when a study of pretrial procedures was prepared. 58
The full potential of the Judicial Conference finally began to
manifest itself in the sessions of 1954, the first over which Warren
presided as Chief Justice. 9 Two studies begun in the last years of
the Vinson administration-on procedural problems in protracted
antitrust cases and on habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners-
were reviewed in detail and specific recommendations made. District
courts were admonished to be firmer in excluding irrelevant and
repetitious evidence, which seemed characteristically to be offered
in antitrust litigation. And a revision of the federal code provisions
on habeas corpus petitions, which anticipated by ten years the
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was endorsed. 0 The conference
strongly recommended congressional action to create a domestic
relations court for the District of Columbia6' and debated (with-
out action) a report on various bills to broaden the removal author-
ity of the federal courts.62 A lengthy 1956 study of the administra-
tion of criminal justice included the matter of reviewing district
court sentences by courts of appeal, and the right of the government
to appeal adverse rulings on motions to suppress evidence.6 3 Diver-
sity jurisdiction was a special item on the agenda in 1956,64 antici-
pating the amendment of the "diversity statute" and leading to
the Chief Justice's recommendation to the American Law Institute
that it undertake a study of the subject.65
By the end of the decade, a systematic inventory of legislative
G7 1941 JuD. CONF. REP. 4, 10-11.
58 1950 JuD. CoNF. REP. 15; 1951 JUD. CoNF. REP. 33; 1952 JUD. CoNF. RaP. 20.
9 The September 1953 session, prior to Warren's appointment as Chief Justice
in October, was presided over by the senior Associate Justice Hugo L. Black.
60 See 80 Stat. 1105, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Cf. 1954 Jun. CoNF. REP. 23; 1956 JuD.
CoNF. RaP. 34.
61 1954 Jun. CoNq. REP. 7. The Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal
Court for the District of Columbia was created in 1956. 70 Stat. 111, D.C. CODE
§ 11-758 (1961).
62 1954 Jui. CONF. REP. 27. 64 Id. at 15.
63 1956 JuD. CoNF. REp. 33-36. 65 1959 A.L.I. PROC. 31-34.
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subjects to be recommended to Congress was a regular feature of
the conference reports, and the volume of business had made
necessary the regular convening of semiannual sessions of the con-
ference. The 1960s witnessed the full flowering of conference
activity: studies of judicial workloads; multiple litigation in catas-
trophe cases; pretrial and trial seminars; implementation of circuit
council recommendations;6 6 venue; jurisdiction in cases involving
pollution of interstate waterways; special problems of juveniles in
federal courts;6 7 establishment of legislative committees within the
circuits; pre-sentence confinement of criminal defendants; training
programs for judicial employees;6 direct action statutes; narcotics
and drug abuse; improved probationary processes; admissibility of
confessions; 69  government contract disputes; 70  definitions of
felonies;71 retirement of judges for disability; a unified correctional
system; a federal bail reform act;7 2 the merger of admiralty and
civil procedure; implementation of the Federal Magistrates Act; 73
prejudicial publicity in jury trials;74 and computerizing of jury
panels.75 The 1969 conference held a special meeting in June to
receive a report on recommended standards respecting outside
compensation for federal judges, a response to the crisis precipitated
by the Fortas cause cilebre.6
Implementation of Judicial Conference studies and recom-
mendations may take the form of rules or orders issued by the
Supreme Court, e.g., the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
amendments to the civil and criminal rules, approved by the con-
ference and adopted by the Court on 4 December 1967.77 In the
matter of legislative recommendations, conference action may take
one of four forms: approval of the proposed bill; suggestions of
amendments to the bill as proposed; disapproval; or abstinence
66 1961 Jun. CONF. REP. 12, 24, 47, 51-53.
67 Id. at 79, 80, 96-97. 72 1966 JUD. CoNP. REP. 6, 15, 35.
68 1962 Jun. CoNF. REP. 54, 69, 71. 73 1967 Jun. Coqp. REP. 18, 40.
69 1963 JuD. CoNF. REP. 14, 40, 42, 90. 74 1968 JuD. Co'. REP. 16, 66-67.
70 1964 JuD. CoNF. RED. 66. T5 1969 Jun. CoNF. REP. 14.
711965 Jun. CoNF. REP. 22. 761d. at 42.
77 389 US. 1063-1127 (1967); 1967 JuD. CONF. REP. 68-69. See also rules imple-
menting the Federal Magistrates Act, 395 U.S. 989-99 (1969); 1969 JuD. CoNF. REP.
34-35.
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from comment on the ground that the subject matter is one of
legislative policy on which a judicial position is inappropriate.
The closest rapport between the conference and Congress, via
the Chief Justice, is obviously needed in matters most intimately
connected with judicial administration. The enactment of the
statute on the Federal Judicial Center78 and on the court executives
for the courts of appeal79 manifestly depended on the authoritative
position of the conference. In other legislative areas the cause-
effect relationship is difficult, and usually impossible, to document,
except in negative instances where Congress acts in disregard of
the conference position 0 Traditionally, Congress has been some-
what chary of inviting members of the higher courts to testify at
hearings, particularly since the avid lobbying of Taft's day.81
With the establishment of the Federal Judicial Center, the
Judicial Conference and various advisory committees of the circuits
have looked to the center for projects involving research in depth
and for scheduling of training conferences for various court
officers.82 First under Associate Justice Clark and then under Judge
Alfred P. Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, the center has developed
a year-round program of studies, training sessions, and related
services.82
The history of procedural law reform in the past half-century
may be divided into two distinct periods. The first falls between
the years 1922 and 1939 and is documented in the judicial and con-
gressional efforts to draft adjective law creating the machinery for
efficient study and improvement of federal justice. The second
perhaps dates from 1954 to the present; the interim was handicapped
by the abnormalities of war and postwar government. Chief Justices
Taft and Hughes in the first period, and Warren in the second,
established records as administrators which are secure. If the
78 See note 55 supra. 79 See note 56 supra.
8 0 See 1971 State of the Judiciary; 1970 JuD. CoNF. REP. 77. For an example of
conference response to legislation requiring implementation, see report of special
meeting of 13 January 1965, which received a detailed report of its Committee to
Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. H.R. Doc. No. 62, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965).
81 See SWINDLER, note 25 supra, ch. 16.
82 See Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 53 JuD. 99 (1969).
8 3 Activities of the center are reported periodically in the federal court bulletin,
THE THIR BRANCH.
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activity of the Burger Court continues in the direction and at the
pace which has characterized its opening years, a third and equally
productive period may be anticipated.
III. STATE REFORMS AND FEDERAL ANALOGIES
If, as congressional policy and the Chief Justice's repeated
public statements have it, the primary relief for the current judicial
crisis must come from modernization of the state courts, and if this
is indeed a continuing national concern, the fundamental problems
in the state systems must occupy a permanent spot on the Chief
Justice's agenda for law reform. As Chief Justice Burger put it in
his address to the Williamsburg conference, both the criminal and
civil justice functions are "suffering from a severe case of deferred
maintenance."' 4 Centralized administration, augmented by person-
nel trained in modern managerial practices and provided with a
reasonable amount of high-speed and high-quality technological
resources; a broad rule-making power vested in the judicial rather
than the legislative branch; simplified trial court structure and a
sound procedure for selecting and training qualified judges were
the priorities the Chief Justice suggested for the program of
modernization. The "much-needed reexamination of substantive
legal institutions that are out of date," he conceded was "inevi-
tably a long-range undertaking and it can wait."' 5
From the National Conference on the Judiciary, which produced
a "Consensus Statement" summarizing the findings of the sessions,""
the LEAA proceeded to the organizing of regional conferences
which, beginning in the winter of 1971-72, are expected to apply
the general conclusions of the national meeting to the particular
problems of states within a convenient and reasonably homogeneous
area. The regional conferences are more or less coextensive with the
LEAA regional divisions.
Not only this evidence of federal interest, but the analogy of the
organization of the federal judiciary, is ever present-although not
necessarily apposite or acceptable. The principle of a unified court
84 Burger, Deferred Maintenance of Judicial Machinery, 54 J. Am. JtU. Soc. 410
(1971); JusTicE IN THE STATEs 10.
85 Burger, note 84 supra, at 411.
86 See Consensus Statement of the National Conference on the Judiciary, 55
J. AM. JuD. Soc. 29 (1971); JUSTICE IN THE STATES 265.
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system, with the chief justice of the state as the head of the state's
judiciary, readily suggests the prototype of the federal system.
But this assumes that the state is a microcosm of the federal struc-
ture, which is valid only in a general sense and most often in pre-
dominantly urban states.87 Political provincialities, both legislative
and judicial; ingrained local practices which often have disconcert-
ing plausibility and effectiveness in the dispensing of justice; the
substantial cost of major overhauls of the existing system; these
are the practical obstacles that grow larger as the reform proposals
come closer to home.
The closest correlation between the unified court system and
the federal judiciary is to be sought in the functions of the chief
justice in each system. Specific functions may vary within juris-
dictions, but the fundamental feature is the authority to oversee
the total judicial process, viz.:88 (1) A general power to require
periodic statistical reports that delineate the business of each court;
to conduct studies as to needs within the system to improve judicial
performance; and to implement plans for these improvements.8 9
This administrative program is normally carried out with the assis-
tance of a peer group (judicial conference or council) empowered
to formulate policy, and an administrative officer charged with the
efficient management of records and schedules. (2) A broad power
to draft and promulgate uniform rules for the whole system -"the
best solution yet developed for sound procedural change," as Chief
Justice Burger has put it. A flexible and responsive rule-making
authority, he went on, would "blunt the impact of the imposition of
federal standards on the states," e.g., in such an area as post-convic-
tion procedure.9 0 (3) The authority to transfer trial judges from
one court to another within the jurisdiction as docket loads may
require. Correlative with this may also be the ex officio participation
of the chief justice in judicial nominating or discipline/removal
87 See the rationale of the majority in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571-75
(1964).
88 See Pringle, The Role of the State Chief Justice, in JusTicE IN THE STATES 80;
INST. JuD. ADA., THE SUPREME COURT Or IowA: A STUDY OF ITS PROCEDURE AND
ADMIMSTRATION (1971).
89 On the administrative duties of the Chief Justice of the United States, see
28 U.S.C. §§ 291-95, 331, 671, 2071; cf. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CONsTITUTION 89-90 (rev. 6th ed., 1968).
00 Burger, note 84 supra, at 415-16.
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commissions,91 or the overseeing of trial courts charged with state-
wide jurisdiction in some types of cases.92 (4) Where the rule-
making power is jointly shared with the legislature, or where
statutory control over procedure is fairly precise, a regular medium
for communication with the legislature on these matters, and per-
haps on legislation in general that creates new responsibilities for
the judicial branch. 93
Thus defined, the administrative authority of the chief justice
in any single judicial system (including the federal) may appear
to be incomplete. The ultimate question, however, is whether the
presiding judicial officer of the state's highest court has the practical
power to develop and maintain consistent and uniform standards
of justice throughout the jurisdiction. Except as the state system
does in fact vest sufficient power for this purpose in this officer,
there is little profit in studying the means by which court modern-
ization in the states can contribute to the alleviation of the national
burden.
Centralized administration, in the federal experience, attained
its full potential for effectiveness with the creation of an administra-
tive office to relieve the Chief Justice of nonjudicial managerial
duties. The analogy applies to the states as well, and the administra-
tive office is most effective in those systems that have a degree of
centralized authority comparable to the federal. Although some
states date their administrative offices from periods before the
federal statute of 1939-e.g., North Dakota's office of executive
secretary to the state judicial council in 1927,94 Connecticut's
executive secretary to the judicial department in 193711- the proto-
type of the modern office is that of New Jersey, created in 1948.96
The work of the state court administrator 97 in the unified court
91 See Calif. Const. Art. VI, §§ 6, 7; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 5, as amended 1966.
92See Conn. Pub. Acts 1959, No. 28; and of. N.C. Const. Art. IV, § 11, as
amended 1962, 1968; Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 5, as amended 1968.
93 Note 84 supra.
94N.D. Cent. Code 27-15-03 et seq.; of. CouRT ADMINISTRATORS, THEIR FUNC-
TIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SALARIES (Am. Jud. Soc. Res. Rep. No. 17, 1966).
95 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 51-8 et seq.
9 6N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:12-1 et seq.
97 See McConnell, The Role of the State Court Administrator, in JUSTICE IN THE
STATES 88. It is worth noting that in the matter of trial court administrators the
states are substantially ahead of the federal judiciary. Cf. Klein, The Position of
the Trial Court Administrator in the States, 50 J. Am. Jul. Soc. 278 (1967).
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systems is quite similar to that of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. The diminishing returns from the system
are found in direct ratio to the decentralization of the courts in
various states. Where neither the chief justice nor his administrative
officer have authority to compel uniform reporting of requested
information from independent and largely autonomous local courts,
the benefits of the services of a state administrator are substantially
curtailed.
A wider variance between state and federal systems develops in
the matter of the appellate process. This is not merely a question of
structure, i.e., as a one-level or two-level appellate system, but is a
question of philosophy as well. 8 Whether a given state requires an
intermediate system of appeals courts presumably depends upon the
volume of appellate business, or perhaps upon geographic conditions
warranting the division of the state into appellate districts 9 But the
fact is that in the twenty or more states that have intermediate courts
there are widely varying concepts of their jurisdictions and func-
tions. Typically, final jurisdiction in the intermediate courts is lim-
ited to relatively minor civil matters; felonies-particularly capital
felonies-and major civil questions consistently go on to the highest
court. This may be as it should be in capital cases. The fact is, how-
ever, that the proper definition of the intermediate court function
in the states is as conspicuously lacking as it was in the federal sys-
tem prior to the Act of 1925.100
This fact bolsters the argument that an intermediate appellate
system merely increases litigation costs without decongesting the
docket of the highest state court. Certainly, state modernization that
takes the form of an intermediate court system is unlikely to con-
tribute significantly to the general streamlining of justice in America
unless and until there is a firm policy limiting appeals as of right.
At the trial court level, the divergence of state and federal systems
is obviously the greatest. At the same time the greatest number of
obstacles to modernization and simplification exist here. If there is
98 Cf. Joiner, The Function of the Appellate System, in JusTicE iN THE STATES
97; Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia? 57 VA L. REv. 3 (1971).
9 ) See AM. JuD. Soc., INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE CouRTs 3 (Res. Rep. No. 20,
1968).
100d. at App. I; cf. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State
Appellate Courts, 24 UNIv. Cm. L. REv. 211 (1957); Editorial, The Case for
a Two-Level State Court System, 50 J. AM. Juv. Soc. 185 (1967).
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an analogy, it is between the dual system of trial courts in most
states and the dual system as it existed in the federal structure prior
to the Judicial Code of 1911.01 Unification, and the abolition of
the part-time local court, are the top priorities among state re-
forms.102 But the almost universal practice of splitting the courts of
first instance into those of general jurisdiction and those of limited,
local, and special jurisdiction (accurately denominated in Virginia
as "courts not of record") make the prospect for reform inauspi-
cious. At best, the dual system breeds trial de novo; at worst, it per-
petuates the practice of fee-paid lay judges or part-time judges." 3
Among nearly forty recommendations for judicial reform drawn
up by the National Conference on the Judiciary under the leader-
ship of the Chief Justice, two went to the heart of the matter: 1
04
There should be only one level of trial court, divided into
districts of manageable size. It should possess general juris-
diction, but be organized into specialized departments for the
handling of particular kinds of litigation. Separate specialized
courts should be abolished.
Only one appeal as of right should be allowed. It should lie
only from a final decision of the trial court and should not be
a trial de novo, but an appeal based on the record, which
should be kept in all cases, utilizing modern recording devices.
Quite accurately, the conferees discerned that it is the congeries
of problems in the state trial and appellate court structure that is
the most forbidding obstacle to uniform modernization.
Even more difficult and involved than procedural reform, as the
Chief Justice pointed out at the Williamsburg conference, is "the
much needed reexamination of substantive legal institutions that are
out of date."'1 5 This would be, he conceded, "a long range under-
taking." In addition to political considerations militating against
action there will obviously be emotional and ethical objections.
Although there is a gradually dawning public awareness of the dis-
tinction between drug traffic and drug addiction, for example, the
movement of state legislatures to reform their statutes and separate
101 See note 27 supra.
102 See McKenzie, Unification and Redistricting, in JUSTICE IN THE STATES 116,
Pomeroy, Lingering Problem: Part-Time Courts, id. at 130.
103 See Truax, Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Are Passi, 53 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 326
(1970).
104 Note 86 supra. 105 Note 84 supra.
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the criminal from the victim, the correctional problem from the
institutional, is glacial.1" 6 On the civil side, after much debate and
research by professional bodies, no state has yet taken a bold step
toward diverting the endless traffic in automobile litigation from
judicial to administrative channels; Massachusetts's experiment with
"no fault" legislation ran a bruising gauntlet in the state house and
has yet to face those in the courthouse.10 7 It is safe to say, in fact,
that a whole new theory of substantive as well as procedural law
will need to be developed before state reform, tied to federal reform
in a nationwide program, will accommodate practical new ap-
proaches in the face of often inapposite federal analogies.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT DECADE
A flurry of activity has marked the opening of the 1970s.
The Institute for Court Management, the American Academy for
Judicial Education, and the National College of District Attorneys
all opened their doors within a few months of each other, comple-
menting the work begun by the National College of State Trial
Judges in the 1960s. The Federal Judicial Center, itself only three
years old, was joined by the National Center for State Courts,
which began initial operations in the summer of 1971. Regional
conferences for the winter of 1971-72 were projected by the
LEAA to stimulate local implementation of the broad objectives
of the National Conference on the Judiciary.
In his second "State of the Judiciary" address, Chief Justice
Burger continued his advocacy of further efforts at renewal. He
noted the funding of an A.B.A. project to bring up to date the 1949
study on standards of judicial administration led by Justice Vander-
bilt.108 He reiterated his recommendation that Congress create a
joint judiciary council to replace "the hit-or-miss process of ex-
panding the burdens of federal courts, heedless of their capacity to
meet the burdens and heedless of the overall soundness of particular
legislation relating to the jurisdiction and operations of the federal
courts.' "10 He also endorsed a proposal of the Judicial Conference
106 See the recent study by NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS
(1971); MoRIS & HAWKINS, note 17 supra, at ch. 5.
107 Mass. Acts 1970, c. 670, Mass. G. L. ch. 90, § 34M.
108 VANDERBILT, MINIMLUM, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1949).
109 1971 State of Judiciary, 856.
262 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
for creation of a special commission to restructure the judicial cir-
cuits of the federal system, and called anew for joint governmental
and professional efforts to deal with the perennial issue of trial and
appellate delays.10
The Court Executives Act, creating offices of administration in
each of the circuits, is one of the most important recent legislative
steps affecting judicial modernization. The final report of the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, filed with
the President and both houses of Congress in January 1971, has
prepared the way for the most comprehensive revision of the Crim-
inal Code since 1909."' This project was complemented by the final
approval of most of the A.B.A. Standards of Criminal Justice, and
the recommendation that each state apply them as yardsticks against
their own statutes, rules of court, and local practices." 2
The Judicial Conference devoted a substantial part of its 1970
sessions to the recommendations of its Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law. It admonished the judicial councils
in each circuit to give "the highest priority" to the preparation of
transcripts in criminal cases for the purposes of review and re-
quested each circuit to file a draft of its plan for implementation of
this directive." 3 Although it disapproved a proposed bill setting
deadlines of 60 to 120 days for commencement of trials of criminal
cases, it did so because it was advised that the purpose of expedition
would be better accomplished by a new administrative requirement
that district courts review all such cases pending more than a year.11 4
The reports of its committees on improvements in the jury system
and probationary processes also occupied a major part of its dis-
cussions.115
In November 1970 the Federal Judicial Center inaugurated the
first state-federal appellate judges' conference, taking up problems
of the proliferation of habeas corpus petitions, removal of cases
110 Id. at 858-59.
111 See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS (1971).
"12 See Comparative Analysis of Nine Approved American Bar Association
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice with Florida Statutory Law,
Court Rules and Legal Practice (1970), prepared for the A.B.A. Section of Crimi-
nal Law.
113 1970 Jun. CONF. REP. 15.
114 Id. at 17. 115 Id. at 58, 65.
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from state to federal courts, and improved techniques in opinion
writing-the last a subject upon which the Chief Justice has ex-
pressed himself unequivocally."' 6 Together with the federal-state
judicial councils recommended by Chief Justice Burger in his 1970
A.B.A. address, the center's conferences represented a tangible ef-
fort at promoting a dialogue between the state and federal systems.
The anticipated close working arrangement between the Federal
Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts would
augment the state-federal conferences and councils.
As the decade of the 1970s proceeds, there is every indication
that communication between the state and federal judiciary and
coordinated efforts at modernization are to be integral parts of the
law reforms sought by the Chief Justice of the United States. The
probable developments include these:
1. Exploitation of the professional training services of the several
colleges, institutes, and academies now established, as well as others
in prospect, to provide basic indoctrination in routines and crafts
for recruits or appointees. While seminars for new judges, court
clerks, probation officers, and others may not become a universal
requisite, the favorable emphasis upon the availability of such prep-
aration may effect a steady growth in reliance upon them. The con-
sensus of the legal profession and the testimony of "alumni" of the
programs attest to their value.
2. Joint conferences, regional and national, following the pattern
of the National Conference on the Judiciary in 1971,11 and cover-
ing a wide variety of specialized subjects, already are supplementing
the training programs of the centers for trial judges, court admin-
istrators, and district attorneys. Together with the growing num-
ber of sentencing institutes and similar judicial exchanges, these are
expediting the pooling of experiences among professional groups
that have long been isolated from each other. The state conferences
of laymen, in which the American Judicature Society successfully
pioneered in the past decade, are creating continuing "citizens'
lobbies" for statutory reforms that otherwise tend to languish in
committees of the state houses for want of public demand for action.
116 1971 State of Judiciary, 858-59.
117 A National Conference on Corrections, "to be patterned after the First
National Conference on the Judiciary," was recommended in a White House
memorandum of 10 June 1971. See 1 LEAA NEWSLETrER 1 (July 1971).
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3. The research centers now serving both federal and state courts
hold out a promise of stimulating concerted studies of all phases
of the administration of justice, from demonstrations of the adapta-
bility of mechanical and technological discoveries to court manage-
ment, through in-depth investigations in procedural and substantive
law, to the ultimate possibility of empirical and theoretical research.
The movement for modernization and reform that Chief Justice
Burger has undertaken to lead is broader than anything in the na-
tion's judicial experience. One may hope that, as it develops, the
centralizing of state court administration may become universal;
that the beginnings 9f merit selection and dignified retirement and
removal procedures (in which the more progressive states offer an
analogy and example for the federal judiciary) may become more
widespread; that some effective substitutes for the manifestly in-
effective correctional processes may be devised. If these sound
fanciful and illusory, it should be remembered that they are the
ultimate goals toward which all the steps heretofore described are
aimed. The alternatives are maintenance or exacerbation of the very
conditions that have created the present judicial crisis.
